It has been suggested that alienation and failed integration may be causes of "Homegrown Radical Islamism" in Western societies. Western countries often expect that migrants and their descendants residing there as citizens will embrace or support common democratic ideals as a predicate for-or consequence of-their societal integration. Conventional wisdom suggests: "The more you associate yourself with the cherished and established goals and means, the more you will disassociate yourself from Radical Islamism," and vice versa. We believe that, quite surprisingly, an empirical test of this idea is lacking. Based on a nationally representative sample of 1,113 youth (ages 15-30) in Denmark with national ties to a"Muslim country," this study provides empirical evidence on the validity of this common assumption.
Introduction
Concerns about "homegrown mujahideen" in Western, democratic countries have energized a global debate about the possible roles of immigration policies and failed integration in facilitating Radical Islamism. 1 The ideology of Islamism is distinct from the religion of Islam. Mozaffari (2007) defines Islamism in its various forms as a complex, multi-dimensional "ideology," a "movement-organization," and as a Abstract It has been suggested that alienation and failed integration may be causes of "Homegrown Radical Islamism" in Western societies. Western countries often expect that migrants and their descendants residing there as citizens will embrace or support common democratic ideals as a predicate for-or consequence of-their societal integration. Conventional wisdom suggests: "The more you associate yourself with the cherished and established goals and means, the more you will disassociate yourself from Radical Islamism," and vice versa. We believe that, quite surprisingly, an empirical test of this idea is lacking. Based on a nationally representative sample of 1,113 youth (ages 15-30) in Denmark with national ties to a "Muslim country," this study provides empirical evidence on the validity of this common assumption.
4. Means-Legitimization: For Totalitarian Islamists, all means are considered to be legitimate in pursuit of its ultimate goal.
To be clear, Totalitarian or Radical Islamists are a subset of Islamists, generally. Many acknowledged Islamists will distance themselves obliquely from conditions one and two, and absolutely from conditions three and four above. 2 After World War II, large numbers of people from "Muslim countries" immigrated to Europe. As Leiken (2005) notes:
"Today Muslims constitute the majority of immigrants in most Western European countries, including Belgium, France, Germany, and the Netherlands, and is also the largest single component of the immigrant population in the United Kingdom. Exact numbers are hard to come by because Western censuses rely ask respondents about their faith. But it is estimated that between fifteen and twenty million Muslims now call Europe home and make up 4-5% of its total population." 3 In many of these Western European countries, immigration policies and practices are designed to facilitate acculturation (adapting to the norms of the dominant culture), and sometimes assimilation (adopting the norms of the dominant culture). The intended objective, however, is integration; to help migrants "fit in" to the social, political, and educational systems and to find a suitable place in the labor market. Host nations hope that 83 their new residents-and their successive generations-will become successful, well-functioning, and loyal members of a democratic society. The social contract is that migrants will make efforts to learn the language and customs, to find a job, and to contribute to-if not participate in-the host nation's prosperity, while the government, for its part, will provide facilities, services, and structures to support the migrants' efforts. Success in this process is often gauged by migrants' ability to be self-sufficient, or at least not posing a burden/cost to the state. (Danish Law of Integration, 2007)
The European Open Coordination System's (EOCS) Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX) measures policies to integrate migrants in twentyfive EU Member States and three non-EU countries. The agency currently uses over 200 indicators (still developing) covering seven policy areas in order to create a multi-dimensional picture of migrants' journeys to full citizenship, relative to "European standards of best practice." 4 The seven MIPEX policy domains include: labor market access, family reunion for third-country nationals, long-term residence, political participation, access to nationality (citizenship), anti-discrimination, and education. It also considers migrants' ambitions for active citizenship in the new country.
Integration-at a national and international level-is often viewed as a top-down process. In the top-down model, the fundamental policy questions for assessing integration are: What do the government and the formal institutions do to facilitate the integration of migrants and descendants? And how they could improve their efforts?
Recognizing the importance of the bottom-up processes during recent years, a supplementary (or alternative) focus has been introduced, where the issue at hand is rather: "What do immigrants and descendants do to integrate themselves into the host societies? In other words, do they actually utilize the mechanisms and opportunities created for them? This supplementary/alternative approach emphasizes immigrants' and descendants' actual participation, adjustment to and adoption of basic cultural values and norms of the host society, changes in the cognitive schemas at collective and individual level among migrants, as well as changes in their behavioral preferences, priorities, and attitudes. 5 Adapting to the host society's language is a particularly critical dimension, which both reflects and facilitates cultural adaptation and value adjustment through social interactions.
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Considering both kinds of processes, we define integration as follows: "Integration refers to the total outcomes of top-down and bottom-up (formal and substantial) processes, policies, and efforts, measured by quantifiable evidence and subjective beliefs about being anchored in a system socioeconomically and also with regard to cognition, attitudes, preferences, and actual behavior. 6, 7 Above all, it involves a substantial association and affiliation with a certain value system into which the subjects are integrating."
Whether and how immigrants successfully integrate into the host society (or even whether they should) is a complicated question that has been the topic of much research and debate. But in an attempt to explain the recent rise of militant Islamist ideologies around the world-including in Western nations, some analysts have suggested that failed (unsuccessful) integration may be to blame. The proposition is that the absence of socioeconomic success, unemployment, poverty, alienation, and discrimination motivates young Muslims in Western countries towards Radical Islamist worldviews. The report Radicalisation, Recruitment, and the EU Counter-radicalization Strategy notes specifically: "poor integration and exclusion of Muslims in Western societies might lay a significant foundation for radicalisation and polarization." 8 The present study seeks to test that idea empirically.
Methods
In this study, we examine empirically (a) the relationship between socioeconomic and cultural integration, and (b) whether the link between those factors is related to "Radical Islamism." In order to empirically elaborate on whether the assumed negative relation between socioeconomic and cultural integration on the one hand and home-grown radical Islamism on the other is statistically true or false, we decided first to elaborate on the core attributes of the concept "Radical Islamism."
Measuring Radical Islamism
The multi-staged process by which we explored and operationally defined "Radical Islamism" has been described extensively elsewhere (see Goli & Rezaei, 2010) . Briefly, our approach, based in phenomenological theory and grounded theory, began with a series of explorative, in-depth interviews with young practicing Muslims, Islamic leaders, academics, and community professionals. We translated the concepts and themes from these interviews into a set of structured questions, which were embedded in a larger, nationally representative telephone survey of youth (ages 15-30) in Denmark with ties of national origin to a "Muslim country" (N=1113). A minority (12.5%) who did not profess Islam were retained as a comparison group. From eighteen of those items, we developed criteria to identify "Radical Islamists" and to distinguish them from secular Muslims, fundamentalists, and even from non-militant Muslims who may be sympathetic to Islamist ideals (Weber, 1997).
Based on weighted responses to these eighteen items (see Table 1 ), participants were parsed into four categorical ideological groupings. For purposes of this analysis, Group Four comprises the "Radical Islamists."
• Group One: Non-Radical Muslims (N=551) comprised about half (49.4%) the sample. Respondents in this category largely did not endorse beliefs, attitudes, or behaviors that characterize a Radical Islamist World view.
• Group Two: The Least Radical Muslims (N=301) accounted for another quarter (27%) of the sample. Respondents in this category endorsed some beliefs, attitudes, or behaviors that are also endorsed by their more radical counterparts. They take their religion very seriously, but their Islamic belief system might be better characterized as fundamentalist.
• Group Three: The Affiliated (N=198) numbered less than one in five (18%) among the sample. Respondents in this category endorse fundamentalist and Islamist beliefs, attitudes, or behaviors but do not necessarily embrace the militancy that characterizes the radicals. Some of these respondents are probably more rebellious, feeling harmed by what they experience as global pressure on Islam, but not identifying with Radical Islamism. This group may be sympathetic to the aspirations and ideals of Radical Islamists, but they do not actively support them.
• Group Four: The Most Radical Muslims (N=63) comprised only 5.8% of the overall sample. Respondents in this category endorsed militant, radical Islamist beliefs, attitudes, and behaviors. They explicitly express affinity and support for, and identification with, known militant, radical Muslim groups.
Measuring Integration
Also included in the nationally representative (Danish) survey was a set of questions measuring sociocultural integration. The socioeconomic aspects are addressed elsewhere in the study. 9 The questions of how best to conceptualize-let alone measure-integration remain highly contested. Based on weighted responses to the eight items below, an "Integration Point" total was calculated for each participant to provide a continuous, scaled measure of integration:
• Do the respondents have a spare-time job, and if so, is the specific enterprise or office owned by immigrants or natives?
• How often do the respondents use the native language (in this case Danish) at work?
• How often do the respondents speak the native language (in this case Danish) at home?
• How often do the respondents speak/use Danish in their spare time and/or in relation to spare-time activities?
• Are those persons the individual respondent considers his/her closest friends natives (Danes) or of an immigrant background?
• Does the respondent find it proper that his family members work at a bank, a supermarket, a pub or café, slaughter house, or in the TV business?
• What popular television programs/series is the respondent viewing?
• With regard to local and national elections, is a candidate's religious attitude taken into consideration by the respondent when deciding to vote?
Results
In analyzing these data, we sought to test the following hypothesis:
Sociocultural and socioeconomic integration and Radical Islamism are inversely related among migrants from Muslim countries living in a Western democracy. 
Social Attitudes and Behavioral Indicators
First, we examined differences in "integration" item endorsement among each of the four ideological categories with regard to social attitudes and behaviors.
Leisure-time job
There was no significant difference among the four ideological groups (χ 2 (9) = 6.67, p = .672) in the proportion who held a leisure-time job. Fewer than a third (29.8%) of all participants reported having a spare (leisure) time job, with most of those (26.5%) working at "Danish" workplaces, and the other 3.3% being employed by immigrant-owned businesses.
Language spoken
There was no significant difference among the four ideological groups (χ 2 (18) = 22.37, p = .216) in whether the dominant language of their workplace (not necessarily meaning at a spare-time job) was Danish or a foreign language. A majority of all respondents said they exclusively or almost exclusively speak Danish at their workplace. This was true for twothirds (66.7%) of the Radical Islamists (Group Four) and for nearly the same proportion (61.7%) of the non-radical Muslims (Group One).
The ideological groups did differ in the frequency with which they spoke the Danish language in their private homes. Overall, more than half (56.4%) of the sample reported speaking Danish at home almost exclusively or very often. While household Danish was quite common (61.4%) among respondents in Group One, it was less commonly (42.9%) reported among those in Group Four.
With regard to the use of the Danish language in relation to spare-time jobs and spare-time activities, there are no differences across the four groups, all around 80%. Data reveals no indication for the impact of the use of language in spare-time on Radical affiliations.
Danish friendships
The ideological groups also differed quite significantly (χ 2 (15) = 86.34, p <.0001) in the extent to which their closest friendships are with native Danes or other immigrants. Across the groups, only a minority (14.2%) reported that their closest friends were Danes, but there was a linear, downward slope corresponding to the degree of radicalism, with the high-est share appearing in Group One and almost no representation in Group Four. The opposite trend is true for maintaining one's closest friendships with other immigrants. Here, there is an upward sloping curve: 81% of the respondents in Group Four-compared to 39% among Group One-have their closest friendships with other immigrants.
Religious proscriptions
One indicator of whether a person with a Muslim background treats Islam's religious code literally is his views about engaging in professional activities requiring contact with objects, artifacts, or processes that are forbidden (haram) in Islam; for example, contact with alcohol, pork, interactions with the opposite sex, charging interest rates on loans (Reba'), etc. Accordingly, we asked respondents whether they thought it violated their religious code to engage in a series of work-related activities. There were significant differences among the four ideological groups with regard to each activity.
• Working in a Danish bank: Only 5% of the sample believed it would violate Islam's religious code to work in a Danish bank, though the prevalence was greater (33%) among the Radical Islamists than among the non-radical Muslims (1.5%) (χ 2 (3) = 123.75, p <.0001).
• Working in a supermarket: There were significant between-group differences in beliefs about whether working in a Danish market violated Islam's religious code (χ 2 (3) = 53.03, p <.0001). One in five (20.6%) of Radical Islamists believed it was a violation, while only 2.5% of nonradical Muslims shared that belief.
• Working in a pub or café that serves alcohol: Again, the between-group differences were significant (χ 2 (3) = 139.79, p <.0001). Two-thirds (66.7%) of Radical Islamists believed that work would offend their religious code, while only 18.9% of those in Group One believed similarly.
• Working in a Danish slaughter house: Though the overall proportions were smaller, the between-group differences were significant (χ 2 (3) = 144.24, p <.0001). Nearly three-quarters (71.9%) of Radical Islamists believed this to be a religious violation.
• Working as a journalist on Danish television: Here, the between-group differences were less substantial, but still statistically significant (χ 2 (3) = 21.06, p <.0001). Only 12.7% of Group Four participants objected to this activity on religious grounds, and only 2% of those in Group One were so inclined.
Television viewing
In the next series of comparisons, we examined differences between the ideological groups in the extent to which they viewed one or more of Denmark's most popular and well-known television programs. There did not appear to be robust and consistent TV viewing differences across the groups.
Programs with an historical bent ("Krønikken" and "Matador" (Denmark)), were viewed somewhat more frequently by Radical Islamists than by non-radical Muslims (15% vs. 5%). In addition, Group Four had the highest viewership endorsement for knowledge-oriented quiz shows and news programs (74.8% for Group One and 90.5% for Group Four).
Voting preferences
Regarding the questions of voting behavior and religious attitude, results suggest that individuals categorized in Group Four are more likely to pay attention to candidates' Muslim background when making voting decisions (χ 2 (12) = 120.99, p <.0001). There was an upward-sloping curve with 7.8% of respondents in Group One and 19% of those in Group Four responding positively to the question.
Language skills
With regard to possible connections between the immigrants' language skills (Danish fluency) and their integration, a majority of all respondents considered themselves to be fluent in Danish at a native level. This was true for 68% of the Radical Islamists, and no significant differences were discerned across groups.
Residential concentration
Because immigrants are often concentrated in certain urban areas, and some immigration analysts believe that hinders integration, we asked respondents' views on the issue. Nearly a third (30.7%) of all respondents find the residential concentration to be a good, or a very good, idea, though the proportion of Group Four respondents who share this attitude is somewhat larger (38.1%).
Cross-ethnic intimate relations
Though we did not ask about the depth and the length of these relationships, we posed the question in the following way: "Have you ever had a Danish boy/girlfriend?" which suggests relationships that are emotionally intimate, not just sexual. About half (47.6%) of the sample reported some sort of intimate relationship with a native Dane. There was a significant difference between the ideological groups (χ2 (6) = 20.57, p = .002), but in an unexpected direction. 10 Cross-ethnic intimate relations with native Danes were more common among individuals in Group Four (50.8%) than among to those in Group Three (29.8%) or Group One (40.1%).
Leisure and Community interests
A substantially larger share of Group Four respondents have leisure interests that occupy much of their spare-time (74.6% vs. 55% for the other groups). The Group Four members were also somewhat more likely than those in Group One to engage in community activities that improve other immigrants' integration and academic achievement (30.2% vs. 20.3% for Group One).
Discrimination experience
A much larger proportion of Radical Islamists (36.5%) experience discrimination in daily life, relative to their non-radical counterparts (5.8%). Most respondents (84.2%) have never or almost never experienced discrimination in relation to work. Less than 10% (8.2%), overall, say they experience work-related discrimination "now and then." Parsing by ideological group, however, the Radical Islamists were more likely to experience occasional work-related discrimination (17.1% vs. 8.2% sample average) and less likely to have never experienced work-related discrimination (48.8% vs. 62.2% sample average). These differences among the four ideological groups, however, were not statistically significant (χ2 (12) = 11.94, p = .450).
Arrest
Less than 15% of the overall sample (12.4%) had been arrested by the police, but the prevalence was distributed rather unevenly across the groups. Only 8.5% of non-radical Muslims had been arrested, but more than a third (36%) of Radical Islamists reported an arrest. That proportion is four times larger than in Group One and more than twice as large as in Groups 2 and 3.
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Religious associations
Though only a small minority of the overall sample reported membership in religious associations, differences between the ideological groups were significant (χ2 (3) = 45.23, p <.001). A linear trend was evident, with 1.3% of those in Group One and 15.9% of those in Group Four engaged with such associations.
Aid/Health organizations
Membership in organizations that focus on social aid and health-related matters was uncommon. Just 3.3% of the sample reported such memberships, and the proportion was distributed evenly across the four groups. Focusing only on these memberships with fellow countrymen, only 3.2% of those in Group Four and 1.3% of those in Group One endorsed participation. Similarly, only 1% of the sample was involved in any "communitylifting" support activities at the local level.
Organized sports activities
Participation in organized sports activities was inversely related to ideological radicalism, though the differences were not statistically significant. There is a slight linear trend, ranging from 11.4% among Group One respondents down to 7.9% among those in Group Four. Though the absolute numbers are small, 3.2% of those in Group Four, compared to 2% in Group One, were involved in organized sports activities, specifically with fellow countrymen. The differences across groups with regard to these activities are too small to foster any ideas about their significance.
Cultural activities
Only 3% of the overall sample reported engaging in cultural activities with Danes, and none of those respondents belonged to Group Four. Even looking specifically at engagement in cultural activities with fellow countrymen, less than 5% of the population across the four groups is engaged in those activities, and there are no significant between-group differences.
Media consumption
There were no significant between-group differences in the reported viewership of Danish national television channels, as a majority of the sample (82.6%) often watched those channels. The same was true for international television channels such as CNN, BBC, and the like, but at a much lower extent (25.8% watch those channels often). Moreover, there were no significant differences between the ideological groups in the extent to which they watched television channels or broadcasting from the country of origin. 40% of all respondents watch those channels regularly, with the lowest endorsement coming from Group One (34.7%). A difference was evident, however, in the consumption of Arabic-language channels like Al-Jazeera, Al-Arabia, MBC, and the like. Just about a quarter (25.4%) of the total sample (and just 15.1% of Group One) watches those channels on a regular basis, but the proportion is much higher among those in Group Four (39.7%) and Group Three (42.4%). Finally, a difference was also noted among respondents who report they do not watch TV at all. About one of every ten (10.3%) in Group One respondents were non-TV watchers, but only 3.2% of those in Group Four were so inclined.
Children's school
We also asked respondents about the kind of schooling their children receive or should receive. Public schools (without consideration of bilingual pupil attendance) generally were selected by about a quarter (24.3%) of the sample, including those in Group Four (23.5%). Radical Islamists, however, were only half as likely as others to select public schools with a majority of Danish pupils (17.6% vs. 31.6%). Overall, public schools with a majority of bilingual pupils were an unpopular choice, with less than 10% (8.4%) of the sample-and none of the Radical Islamists-endorsing that option. Perhaps the most striking difference between the ideological groups pertains to the preference for an Islamic Free School. While 8.4% of the entire sample endorsed that option, it was selected by nearly one in four of the Radical Islamists (23.5%). 
97

Socioeconomic Indicators
Income For this analysis we categorized monthly income levels to differentiate those who are "poor" or "not poor" in Denmark and designated those with 10,000 Danish krone (DKR) ($1,845 dollars) or more after living expenses as "higher income." 11 We set "zero" income as the marker of absolute poverty. There were some differences between Group Two and Group Three, though nothing that illuminates the present hypothesis.
Among self-sufficient respondents with higher incomes, we find that nearly 25% of the respondents in Group Four have more than 10,000 DKR at their disposal after taxes and housing expenses are paid, compared to about 12% on average for the entirely self-sufficient sample (N=577).
Housing
Housing is another key socioeconomic indicator, which we measured here by assessing whether respondents owned a home or were renting. The great majority of all respondents (69.5%) were living in rented apartments, and very few in rented houses. There were no significant differences in home/apartment ownership, with 3.2% of those in Group Four compared to 5.0% of those in Group One reporting they owned rather than rented.
Educational attainment
Among respondents with the lowest level of formal education, Group Four is somewhat overrepresented (14.3%), relative to the other ideological groups (7.1% in Group One, 1.1% in Group Two and 5.5% in Group Three). Conversely, at the highest educational levels, Group Four (5.7%) is somewhat underrepresented (e.g., 18.6% for Group One). Relatively larger shares of respondents in Group Four (20%) are engaged in middle-range (college) education.
Educational merits
We compared educational record/merit achievements, recognized in Denmark, obtained by respondents in each of the four groups. There were no between-group differences in regard to lower, primary-school level merits. The Radical Islamists, however, had a greater proportion of respondents with professional-level merit (15% for Group Four vs. an average of 7.2% for the other three groups). It is fair to say that mediumterm educations were more typical of Group Four respondents, but there is no evidence to suggest that they are more educated than the others.
National Exam Score
Denmark administers national examinations to measure academic achievement. Scores range from -3 to 12. We asked respondents about their most recent exam score. For each score level, there were virtually no differences between the ideological groups until level 7 (roughly equivalent to a C+), where a majority of Group Four (52.2%) have obtained these results, compared to slightly less than half (45%) of those in Group One. At level 10 (akin to a B+), however, only 14% of Group Four attained that score, compared to 21.1% for Group One. Just over 3% of the total sample (3.2% of Group Four and 2.6% of the other groups) achieved the highest possible score of 12 (A+ equivalent), but there were no significant differences among the ideological groups (χ2 (21) = 13.13, p = .904). Aggregating the "above-average" exam scores (to include 7, 10 and 12), the proportion of those in Group Four (68.9%) is virtually identical to that of the other groups (69%). There is therefore no evidence for differences with regard to exam scores across the groups.
Marital Compatibility Indicators
Another dimension of sociocultural integration and accommodation is reflected in views on marital compatibility. We asked respondents what factors would be important to them in considering the appropriateness of a marriage partner for their own child.
Family relation
An overwhelming majority find it of no importance that the partner is a relative. Slightly-but not significantly-more of those in Group Four (6.3% vs. 4.1% average) find it important that the person is a relative.
Language and culture
There were no differences among the ideological groups in preferences for the partner having an identical lingual and cultural background. More than half of the entire sample believe it is important for the bride and groom to share a common language and culture.
Professional and educational status
Most respondents viewed professional and educational status as a key area of compatibility. Just a third (34%) of the entire sample-and about 16% of the Radical Islamists-viewed that compatibility as absolutely unimportant.
Religiosity
Significant differences between ideological groups existed in the importance of religious compatibility. While less than half of the sample (39%) identified it as being very important that the partner is a righteous Muslim, that feature was endorsed by more than two-thirds (69.8%) of the Radical Islamists (vs. 24.8% for Group One).
National background
Only about a quarter (23.3%) of the entire sample found it important that the marriage partner be a native Dane. Those in Group Four endorsed this item less frequently (12.7%) than those in Group One (26.5%).
Religious Indicators
Among those who professed Islam, we also asked a series of questions, beyond those used for ideological group classification, concerning religious attitudes and duties.
Rule supercession
We posed the question of whether Muslim immigrants should follow Islamic law (Sharia) or the National law if the two mandates are in conflict. About one in five (19.1%) of the sample, overall, said that Islamic law should take precedence, but there was a notable gap among the ideological groups, with only 6.6% of non-radical Muslims and more than half (55.5%) of Radical Islamists deferring to Sharia.
Death for an Apostate
We asked if a Muslim turns his/her back to the Islamic faith by converting to another religion, whether it is proper to kill him/her according to the Sharia. Only 1.1% of the non-radical Muslims agreed the killing would be proper, but nearly a third (30.2%) of the Radical Islamists endorsed it.
Righteousness and Alcohol
We asked whether it was acceptable for a Muslim to drink alcohol now and then, and still consider himself/herself a good Muslim. Fewer than one in five (15.9%) thought that practice was proper. It was endorsed somewhat more frequently among the non-radical Muslims, but quite rarely (1.6%) among the Radical Islamists. Indeed, a substantial majority (87.4%) of those in Group Four averred complete disagreement with that idea.
Religious duties
A significantly larger proportion (more than half) of the Radical Islamists-compared to non-radical Muslims-reported adherence to each of Islam's religious duties, including payment of Zakat and Khoms (Group One=27.6%), daily prayer (Group One=25.7%), Juma (Friday Prayer) (38.3% for Group One vs. 76.2% for Group Four), fasting (49.4% for Group One vs. 90.5% for Group Four), and prayers of petition (40% for Group One vs. 73% for Group Four). 
Citizenship/Integration Indicators
Missing their native country
We asked respondents whether or not dissatisfaction in their lives could be related to their absence from their country of origin. Only one person in the entire sample said so, and that respondent was not in Group Four.
Feeling displaced/alienated
Almost none of the respondents expressed the feeling of being a stranger or stated that they do not fit in (in Denmark). Only five respondents in the entire sample-distributed more or less evenly across the ideological groups-mentioned alienation as a source of dissatisfaction.
Native-country travel
As one measure of native-country longing, we asked how often respondents travelled to their countries of origin. To our knowledge, there is no country of origin to which respondents are absolutely not permitted to travel. Sometimes such travel can be associated with difficulties and risks, but it is not in any case completely impossible. Radical Islamists tend to visit their native countries somewhat less frequently than other Muslims, but there was no statistically significant difference between the ideological groups (χ2 (15) = 19.08, p = .210). 
Formal citizenship
We also explored whether there was a relationship between formal citizenship status and ideological posture. The majority, however, across all groups are Danish citizens (58.3% among Group One, and 60.3% among Group Four). Furthermore, data regarding dual citizenship indicates almost identical distribution across groups, though on a lower level. 
National identification
We asked respondents how they viewed and described their own national identity. About one in ten (9.3%) identified his national identity as a Dane. The proportion self-identifying as Danes was nearly identical at both ends of the ideological spectrum; 11.1% of Group Four and 12.7% of Group One. In contrast, Radical Islamists (Group Four) were more likely (41.3%) than the sample overall (24.5%) to identify themselves in relation to their country of origin. Moreover, while almost a third (62.2%) of respondents reported dual national identities, the proportion among Group Four members was much lower.
Voting behavior
One of the most highlighted aspects of formal citizenship is political participation. There were significant differences between the ideological groups in their reported participation in elections. Only 4% of non-radical Muslims (and a similar portion of those in Groups Two and Three) said they do/will not vote, but 39.7% of the Radical Islamists said they would not.
Discussion
Since the most recent rise of militant Islamist terrorism, concerns have flourished about the broader challenge posed by radical Islamist ideologies, particularly as they arise in Western democratic countries. In this study, we did not seek to explain so-called "homegrown" terrorism or its causes, but rather to test a specific hypothesis about the association between migrant integration and radical Islamism within a Western European country (Denmark). Some have suggested that Muslims may become radical when they migrate to Western countries because they fail to integrate. That is the question we sought to address, and our data do not support the idea that failed integration in a Western nation is a major cause of radicalism.
We explored a broad range of factors associated with sociocultural integration and compared them across a spectrum of four ideological groups, with Group One representing non-radical Muslims and Group Four representing the Radical Islamists. We found few, if any, significant differences.
The most radical element does not appear especially vulnerable to sociocultural strain. They are no more likely than others to hold a second, parttime job. Most of them do not. They appear not to be conflicted about speaking Danish at work, though less than half of them speak Danish at home. The Radical Islamists were more likely to maintain their closest friendships with other immigrants, but they were no less likely-and in fact were more likely than other Danish Muslims-to have had a native Dane as a boyfriend or girlfriend. Like many other immigrants, they did not feel shunned by the emergence of diasporas, but instead saw the residential concentration of immigrants to be a good, or a very good, idea. They watch television and consume Danish media, though they are slightly more inclined to watch historical programs, quiz shows, or knowledge-oriented programs.
Though immigrants often maintain some degree of connection to their countries of origin, this affinity did not appear to be systematically greater among the more radical element. The Group Four Radical Islamists were no more likely than others to report that they missed (longed for) their native country; no more likely to feel displaced or alienated (only five respondents in the entire sample felt that way); no more likely to travel frequently back to their native countries; and no less likely to be Danish citizens (though they are less likely to vote) or to describe their own national identity as that of a Dane.
Moreover, the Radical Islamists do not appear especially vulnerable to socioeconomic strain, either. The most radical group was not overrepresented among the poor, but indeed, was somewhat overrepresented among respondents with a higher income. They were no more or less likely than others to be renting-as opposed to owning-their home. They do not appear to be educationally disadvantaged. Though more of them do have lower levels of educational attainment, there are also more of them who are doing college-level education. In their achievement and educational merits, they do not fall behind, but seem generally to keep pace with their other Muslim peers.
Taken together, these comparisons do not suggest that Muslim radicals integrate more poorly in a Western country. There were some notable differences between the ideological groups, however, and these may begin to illuminate some of the truly important between-group differences. With regard to their sociocultural experiences, the Radical Islamists were about three times more likely than the non-radical Muslims to have been arrested by the police. Indeed, a third of them reported a prior arrest. Similarly, Radical Islamists were much more likely than their non-radical counterparts to experience discrimination in their daily lives, though differences in work-related discrimination were less common and much less pronounced.
The sharpest and most consistent differences between the Radical Islamists and other Muslim immigrants concerned their adherence to religious duties and proscriptions. More than half of the most radical group deferred to Sharia over National law, and a third endorsed death as punishment for apostasy. Nearly nine out of ten completely rejected the notion that a person could occasionally consume alcohol and still consider himself/herself to be a good Muslim. The majority in Group Four reported faithful adherence to each of Islam's religious duties, consistently more than the non-radical Muslims. They were about three times more likely to prefer their children be educated in an Islamic Free School, and much more emphatic about the need for their children's marriage partner to share their same religion. Finally, the Group Four radicals also had much more conservative views about the appropriateness of engaging in professional activities requiring contact with objects, artifacts, or processes that are forbidden (haram) in Islam-for example, contact with alcohol, pork, interactions with the opposite sex, charging interest rates on loans (Reba'), etc.
Based on these results, integration per se does not appear to be linked to sociocultural or socioeconomic integration. In many ways, the absence of an association may be unsurprising. Integration-like ideologies-rarely develops from discrete, transformative events, but instead tends to involve an array of social, psychological, cultural, and contextual factors that are dynamic and interactive and that evolve over time. Indeed, even if integration is not a cause of radicalization, these results-and the method by which we study these processes-certainly raise some additional interesting questions about how various political ideologies and cultural integration might affect each other. Moreover, they point to a related-though perhaps more controversial-question: Is it possible for a person to be simultaneously "integrated" in potentially conflicting value systems-e.g. the value system of the (democratic) country of residence and that of Radical Islamism?
As noted in the introduction, we take a fairly broad view of "integration" to include top-down and bottom-up (formal and substantial) processes, policies, and efforts to anchor immigrants in the host country's value system. Anchoring is inversely related to the processes of marginalization and isolation, which tend to push individuals and collectives towards competing value systems. Using Kristensen's definition, we suggest that the most important "spheres of social life"-like those of welfare states-are The Market, The State, and The Civil Society. The "normative expectations of participation," as Kristensen puts it, attached to these areas of social life are having a job/occupation (which indicates participation in the market), having formal citizenship rights (which indicates participation/inclusion in state governance), and membership in pro-social community organizations (which indicates participation in the civil society). In our study, however, there were largely no differences among the ideological groups with regard to these core indicators.
Key to Kristensen's concept of marginalization is the notion of "voluntariness," which requires autonomy and the exercise of free choice. While the immigrants in the sample were largely self-sustaining participants in Danish society, a subset of them-particularly the Radical Islamists-have chosen to distinguish themselves from some of the normative-or at least "typical"-expectations of participation by adhering primarily to their religious value system (rather than a secular State-based value system) to guide their behavior. They are, for example, considerably uncompromising with regard to engaging in professional activities they experience as being in disharmony with religious proscriptions. Perhaps this is not an indication of marginalization, but rather a bold display of autonomy and choice.
While the forces of marginalization push people to the social periphery, those of integration pull-or attract-them toward the center. As Kirstensen notes, however, it is fundamentally a voluntary process. Might this suggest that rather than attempting to achieve integration by constraining citizens' attitudes, beliefs, and behaviors, that respectfully encouraging autonomy in immigration policies and practices might be even more productive?
The results from this study-while not supporting a link between migrant integration and radicalism-do appear to be quite compatible with the core liberal (in the non-partisan sense of that term) notion that for the individual, integration is a right, but not an obligation. Requiring assimilation-not just cultural integration-of the dominant societal values might restrict or deny individual autonomy, on which the citizen's (of the plural society) self-confidence (as the manifestation of emotional recognition), self-respect (as the manifestation of the juridical recognition) and self-esteem (as a result of solidarity recognition), is built. 13 About the Authors 
